

tile provocations, the United States must make it unmistakably clear to the Communist aggressors that we will not back down in the defense of American lives and freedom, and further, we are prepared to use whatever force necessary to maintain this firm foreign policy.

I wish to include news release No. 579-64, from the Office of the Department of Defense with the time schedules discussed. Further, I have all other material and releases, herein referred to, on file in my office:

SUMMARY OF CARRIER AIR STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Following are the results, based on latest reports, of the 64 attack strike sorties flown from the U.S. Navy aircraft carriers U.S.S. Ticonderoga and U.S.S. Constellation to five targets in the Gulf of Tonkin, North Vietnam:

(a) Of the some 30 patrol craft sighted during the attacks, it is estimated that 25 patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.

(b) Ninety percent of petroleum storage facility at Vinh destroyed.

(c) Seven antiaircraft installations in Vinh area destroyed or severely damaged.

The U.S.S. Ticonderoga aircraft conducted three of the attacks against North Vietnam patrol boat concentrations and their associated support facilities. One strike was on the boats and facilities located at Quang Khe. The second and third were on additional boats and activities at Phuoc Loi and on the petroleum storage area located at nearby Vinh. In addition, there was also a restrike made on the Vinh oil storage area.

The Quang Khe attack, which took place at 1:15 a.m., e.d.t., was accomplished by six F-8 Crusader jets. The strike at Phuoc Loi, including the nearby oil storage area at Vinh, was conducted at 1:25 a.m., e.d.t., by six F-8 Crusaders, six A-4 Skyhawks, and four A-1 Skyraider aircraft. Ten A-4 Skyhawks and four F-8 Crusader jets participated in the restrike at Vinh at 4:45 a.m., e.d.t. An estimated eight storage tanks were set ablaze during the first attack on Vinh. From two to four additional tanks were set ablaze during the second raid.

Moderate antiaircraft fire was encountered during the first strike on Vinh and two antiaircraft positions near the oil storage area were attacked and destroyed. During the restrike, a heavier concentration of antiaircraft was encountered and an estimated five guns of a six-gun position were subsequently destroyed.

One Crusader aircraft sustained flak damage during the first attack on Vinh but proceeded safely to Da Nang, South Vietnam.

Navy aircraft from the carrier Constellation began a simultaneous attack on the remaining two targets, Hon Gay and Loc Chao at 3:45 a.m., e.d.t. Ten A-4 Skyhawks, two F-4 Phantomas, and four A-1 Skyraiders, participated in the attack on Hon Gay. Five A-4 Skyhawks, three F-4 Phantomas, and four A-1 Skyraiders participated in the raid on Loc Chao.

Five patrol craft were sighted during the attack on Hon Gay and it was estimated that all five were destroyed. At Loc Chao, two of the six patrol craft sighted were seriously damaged. Both attacks lasted 25 minutes.

Aircraft attacking Hon Gay experienced moderate to heavy antiaircraft fire during the attack from numerous gun positions on the hill overlooking the harbor. Also, all operating guns aboard all of the patrol craft were fired throughout the attack. The Navy aircraft utilized 2.75-inch rocket and 58-millimeter strafing attacks at both Hon Gay and Loc Chao.

One A-4 Skyhawk from Constellation was shot down by antiaircraft fire during the attack on Hon Gay. The pilot reported he was hit after completing his second attack

on the patrol boats in Hon Gay Harbor. He indicated that his plane was uncontrollable and that he was ejecting. Witnessing pilots, who were also being subjected to heavy antiaircraft fire, indicated that they saw a splash approximately 3 miles from the harbor entrance, which could have been the downed Skyhawk. A 60-second "beeper" which is normally activated when a chute opens was heard over the radio, but there has been no confirmed report of the sighting of a parachute. Lt. (jg.) Everett Alvarez, Jr., of San Jose, Calif., previously reported as missing, was the pilot of this plane.

A second aircraft from Constellation, an A-1 Skyraider was lost due to antiaircraft fire during the attack on Loc Chao. No parachute was seen and the aircraft was observed to crash into the sea in the vicinity of the Loc Chao Estuary.

A third aircraft from Constellation, an A-1 Skyraider was hit by antiaircraft fire in the vicinity of Loc Chao but made a safe return to the ship with minor damage.

THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND THE RADAR CLAIMS

(Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. FOREMAN) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD).

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the administration of our Government has officially claimed that President Johnson's announcement of U.S. Navy reprisal against North Vietnamese PT boat bases 1 hour and 39 minutes before it began did not provide the North Vietnamese defenders opportunity for a prior warning. The administration officially claims that at the time President Johnson spoke our aircraft already had been picked up on North Vietnamese radar.

At an air speed of 500 miles per hour a jet aircraft travels approximately 825 miles in 1 hour and 39 minutes. If the naval aircraft were that far away, it obviously would have been impossible to detect them and identify them as intending an attack.

Contrarily, if the aircraft were within credible radar range they must have been maneuvering on varying courses during the 1 hour and 39 minute period from which it would have been impossible to identify them as intending an attack.

Both yesterday and the day before yesterday I called on the administration from this forum to explain this obvious defect in its claim. No explanation has been made. Again, I call for an explanation.

BEEF IMPORTS

(Mr. BATTIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BATTIN. Mr. Speaker, in its lead editorial this morning, the Washington Post in effect argues that the American cattle industry is expendable in the interests of larger foreign trade policy objectives.

This editorial reflects an attitude all too prevalent in the higher policymaking echelons of the Johnson administration. For as I have pointed out many times in the past, the crux of our Nation's beef import problem lies in our Government's failure to look after the

interests of domestic producers as foreign countries protect their domestic economic interests.

In my speech of August 4, I stated that while our domestic beef industry has been under growing economic assault from foreign producers, notably those of British Commonwealth nations, the Johnson administration has failed to take the firm steps necessary to safeguard our vital national economic interests.

Is it too much to ask—

I said in that speech—

that this administration be willing to protect American cattlemen as other countries protect their own?

In this regard, I cited British imposition of direct tariff increases as a means of enforcing beef import controls. Actually, the British have relied on methods other than direct tariffs to enforce such controls in the interests of market stability in that country. In fact, according to the authoritative study of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service, an agreement was reached last year, 1963, for at least one beef-producing country completely to curtail shipments into Britain to stabilize cattle prices there.

Obviously, the affected producing country might be expected to face a surplus problem unless the U.S. market provided a substitute for lost British trade. In this way, stabilized British cattle prices could result in further market instability in the United States. By my point here is not to criticize such an agreement, for the British are within their rights to attempt to stabilize their domestic markets. This supports my primary point on August 4 that the British have never hesitated to take whatever domestic economic steps they felt necessary to protect their own economy.

British Commonwealth nations have constructed a veritable mass of trade barriers, both direct tariff and nontariff in nature, to protect their livestock and meat industries. The Foreign Agricultural Service cites instance after instance of Australian and New Zealand prohibitions and inhibitions against meat produced in the United States.

In fact, a combination of such barriers protects over 50 percent of the affected industries of these British Commonwealth areas, although both Australia and New Zealand are among the largest beef exporters in the world.

Once again, I cite these arguments not to dispute the right of other countries to impose such domestic restrictions as they believe are needed to protect their native producers. Rather, all I am asking is that our own U.S. Government exercise equal rights in seeking to stabilize our own beef market here.

In this regard, I find it strange that some spokesmen for British and British Commonwealth countries, as well as the Common Market countries, argue against our right to protect our domestic interests in the way they protect their own. For whether the British and other foreign nations curtail U.S. products by means of direct tariff or indirect nontariff barriers, when they object to U.S.